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NOTES
THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONS
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in American
Medical Association v. United States once again brought to the front
the problem of the corporate practice of professions.
On February 24, 1937, Group Health Association Inc. was granted
a charter in Washington, D. C.2 By its certificate of incorporation and
its by-laws the corporation was empowered to treat its members and
their dependents, through hired agents and employees, for any and
all diseases and injuries.3 The certificate expressly provides that Group
Health Asociation, Inc., is "to provide ... for the services of physi-
cians and other medical attention and any and all kinds of medical,
surgical and hospital treatment to members here-of and their depend-
ents. ' '4 This corporation offered memberships in a risk sharing, pre-
payment health plan to certain government employees. It employed two
surgeons, one pediatrician, one urologist, and one obstetrician ;5 and
through this staff offered to render most types of medical and surgical
treatments at a stated annual cost. esides offering services to individ-
uals, Bit went further and for a lump sum of $40,000 agreed to extend
similar medical and hospital services to such employees of the Home
Owners Loan Corporation office as paid a monthly fee.
The Medical Society of the District of Columbia opposed this plan
on the grounds that it not only contravened the best interests of both
the public and the profession, but also violated the principles and
ethics of the American Medical Association.6 Knowing these facts,
several members of the Society nevertheless accepted employment of
Group Health. One such member 7 was expelled from membership after
charges had been brought against him in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Society.
The newspapers took up the story of this struggle and early in
1938, when comment pro and con had attained a national scope,
I January 18, 1943, 63 S.Ct. 326.
2 The corporation was organized under the title of the code for the District of
Columbia providing for the incorporation of societies for "benevolent, chari-
table, educational, literary, musical, scientific, religious, or missionary pur-
poses, including societies formed for mutual improvement or the promotion
of the arts." D.C. Code (1929) tit. 5, Section 121.
3 See Certificate of Group Health Association, Inc., article 3, filed in the office
of Recorder of Deeds, District of Columbia, on February 24, 1937, and re-
corded in Title 53, folio 556, et. seq. Also By-laws of the Group Health Asso-
ciation, Inc., Art. V, section 5, as revised October 25, 1937, and filed together
with the certificate of incorporation.
4 Certificate of Group Health Association, Inc., Article 3.
5 Questions and Answers about Group Health (1937) section 9.
6 (1938) 111 J. Am. Med. Ass'n. 1194.
7 Washington Post, March 27, 1938, Magazine section.
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Representative Scott8 offered a resolution in Congress calling for an
investigation of the antagonistic activities of the Medical Society of
Washington, D. C., and of the American Medical Association.
Because of the notoriety the matter had received and in fear of a
quo warranto proceeding by the district attorney for the illegal practice
of medicine and by the superintendent of insurance for selling insur-
ance, the Group Health Asociation, Inc., sought a declaratory judg-
ment as to its right to provide medical services according to its plan.
In July, 1938, Justice Bailey, in deciding Group Health Association,
Inc. v. Moor (D.C.D.C. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 445, held that the corpo-
ration through its licensed physicians was not illegally practicing medi-
cine, nor was it within the scope of regulatory insurance laws because
it provided services rather than money benefits to its contributing
members.
In August, 1938,1 Asistant Attorney-General Thurman Arnold
warned the American Medical Association and the Medical Society
that the expulsion or threatened expulsion of members for allying
themselves with Group Health, or for having professional relations
with doctors of that organization amounted to forcing its members to
participate in an illegal boycott of the Group Health Association's
doctors; and the exclusion by Washington hospitals of physicians who
were not members of the Medical Society ". . . may or may not
amount to coercion upon them.. ."o and that, "In the opinion of the
Department of Justice, this is a violation of the anti-trust laws because
it is an attempt on the part of one group of physicians to prevent quali-
fied doctors from carrying on their calling."
On October 17, 1938, Arnold placed the matter in the hands of the
Federal Grand Jury. An indictment was returned in the District Court
of the United States for the District of Columbia under Section 3
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,1 ' naming as defendants the American
Medical Association, two of its subordinate bodies, the Washington
Academy of Surgery, and twenty-one individual doctors, all members
of the American Medical Association.'12 The indictment charged that
8 Honorable Byron Scott, 83 Cong. Rec., May 3, 1938 at p. 8101.
9 Mimeograph release of the Department of Justice signed by Thurman Arnold,
Assistant Attorney General, and approved by Homer Cummings, Attorney
General, July 30, 1938, and (1938) 111 J. Am. Med. Ass'n. 537.
-0 Ibid.
1126 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. 3 (1927). "Every contract, combination in
form of trust or otherwise, a conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
in . ..or of the District of Columbia ... is declared illegal. Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $5000 or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
12The Medical Society of the District of Columbia and Harris County Medical
Society of Harris County, Texas.
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the defendants had combined and conspired together for the purpose
of (1) restraining the business of the Group Health Association;
(2) restraining the members of the Group Health Association from
obtaining by cooperative methods medical care from doctors engaged
in such group practice; (3) restrainiig the doctors of the staff and
certain other doctors 8 from pursuing their callings; (4) restraining
the business of the Washington hospitals. All of the defendants
demurred to the indictment and were sustained by the District Court
on grounds, amongst others, that neither the practice of medicine nor
the business of the Group Health Association is a trade within the
meaning of the term as used in the Sherman Act.
Notice of appeal was filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia on July 31, 1939. On hearing the Court
of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the restraint of
trade prohibited by statute may be extended both to medical practice
and to the operations of the Group Health Association. United States
v. American Medical Asociation, 72 App. D.C. 12, 110 F. (2d) 703,
710, 711.
The case then went to trial in the District Court. Certain defendants
were acquitted by direction of the judge. As to the others the case
was submitted to the jury which found the American Medical Asso-
ciation and the Medical Society of the District of Columbia guilty.
This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals which reiterated
its ruling as the applicability of Section 3 of the Sherman Act, consid-
ered alleged errors and affirmed the judgments. American Medical
Association v. United States, App. D.C., 130 F. (2d) 233.
The matter went to the Supreme Court on certiorari limited to these
questions: (1) Whether the practice of medicine and the rendering of
medical services as described in the indictment are "trade" under Sec-
tion 3 of the Sherman Act; (2) whether the indictment charged or
the evidence proved "restraint of trade" under Section 3 of the Sher-
man Act; (3) whether a dispute concerning terms and conditions of
employment under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts was in-
volved, and, if so, whether petitioners were interested therein, and
therefore immune from prosecution under the Sherman Act.
In affirming the judgments the Supreme Couit did nto consider
the first question, but did answer the second question in the affirmative
and the third question in the negative.
In answering the second question Justice Roberts said, "Group
Health is a membership corporation engaged in business or trade,"
and, "The fact that it is cooperative, and procures services and facili-
13 Doctors not on the staff of Group Health Association but who engaged in
consultations with the staff doctors.
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ties on behalf of its members only, does not remove its activities from
the sphere of business."
What is this so-called "trade or business" that Group Health is
engaged in?
Justice Bailey having held that it was not the practice of medicine,
justified his decision on the grounds that the corporation itself is not
prescribing for the sick, but it merely enters contracts with licensed
physicians, who in turn prescribe for the members of the corporation,
and that these physicians are independent contractors.14 He attempted
to distinguish the admittedly illegal practice of medicine by corpora-
tion from mere contracts made by a corporation with physicians for
the purpose of securing medicinal services for the members of the cor-
poration; he reasoned that since one person may contract in advance
for the services of a physician over a period of time, an incorporated
group of persons may do likewise.35
It may be seen that both the reasoning and the conclusion of Jus-
tice Bailey are unsound; first, because it is evident that under Group
Health's plan the physicians are not independent contractors, but are
employees of the corporation; and second, because the existence of
the distinction between "practicing medicine" and "furnishing medical
services," while providing grounds for verbalistic conflict, is a nullity
in the eyes of a practical thinker, both being mere labels for the same
series of acts.
Justice Roberts having held that Group Health is engaged in busi-
ness or trade said, "The fact that it is cooperative and procures services
and facilities on behalf of its members only, does not remove its activi-
ties from the sphere of business." Apparently Justice Roberts means
that in spite of the fact that Group Health confines its services to its
own members, it is nevertheless engaged in business. That that is true
is self evident, but likewise it is evident that he avoided saying just
what business Group Health is in. This turns us back to Justice Bailey's
answer-the business of "furnishing medical services," or as herein
submitted, the business of practicing medicine.
That the privilege of practicing a profession is one residing solely
in individuals has long been recognized. A learned profession can only
be practiced by a duly qualified human being. His authorization to
practice is given, not only because of the fact that upon examination
he has proved possession of the essential skill and knowledge of the
subject, but also because upon appraisal being made of his character
14 Group Health Asociation, Inc., v. Moor and Pine. U. S. District Court of the
District of Columbia, July 27, 1938.
15 Ibid.
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he has proven possession of those moral qualities which merit public
trust.' 6
While for some purposes-it is considered legally a person,' 7 a cor-
poration being an artificial entity, existing only in the contemplation of
the law, has neither the right nor the power to practice a profession.'
A corporation being a fictitious character has no mind and cannot
think; consequently, it cannot meet educational requirements. The
practice of a profession necessarily involves the intimate and confiden-
tial relation of trust and confidence between practitioner and client or
patient. The courts hold that a corporation cannot satisfy these con-
siderations.' 9
Whether or not a corporation may lawfully sell the technical or
professional services of its licensed employees depends, in the absence
of express statutory language, 20 on the policy which the court finds
embodied in the license statute. 2' In the case of trade licenses, the
sole purpose of the licensing act is to assure technical competence in
those who do the work and as early as 1756 it was held that no statu-
tory policy was violated when an unlicensed entity sold the services
of licensed artisans. 22 Similarly, a corporation was allowed to sell the
services of licensed architects, 23 but the policy of the medical license
statutes, as conceived by the courts, has been to accord the physician
the same professional status as the common law provides to the
lawyer.24 The analogy found in the practice of law has been applied by
the courts to physicians in establishing the general rule that as a cor-
poration lacks ethical standards and is incapable of personal relations,
16 State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).
In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
17 A corporation is a citizen for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, Doctor v.
Harrington ,196 U.S. 579 (1905) ; however, it is not a citizen within the pur-
view of Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution to the effect that the "citizens
of each state shall be entitled to all of the privileges and immunities of the citi-
zens of the several states." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1868).
18 People by Kerner v. United Medical Service, 362 IIl. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936);
Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Col. 285, 14 F. (2nd) 67
(1931); Win. Messer Co. v. Rothstein, 129 App. Div. 215, 113 N.Y.S. 772
(1908).
'9 People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922);
In re Shoe Manufacturers' Protective Association, 3 N.E. (2d) 746 (Mass.
1936) ; People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P. (2d) 429 (Cal. 1938); People v.
United Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).20 In re Associated Lawyers, 134 App. Div. 350, 119 N.Y.S. 77 (1909); Winberry
v. Hallehan, 361 Ill. 121, 147 N.E. 552 (1935).
21 People by Kerner v. United Medical Service, Supra; Painless Parker v. Board
of Dental Examiners, Supra; Win. Messer Co. v. Rothstein, Supra.2 2 Raynard v. Chase, 1 Burr 3, 97 Eng. Rep. 155 (1756). Cf. Win. Messer Co.
v. Rothstein, Supra.
23 People ex rel State Board of Examiners v. Rodgers Co., 277 Ill. 151, 115 N.E.
146 (1917); People v. Allied Architects' Ass'n., 201 Cal. 428, 257 Pac. 511(1927).
24 In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
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it not only is unable to receive a medical license, but also it is unlawful
for a corporation to sell the services of a licensed physician.
25
If a corporation were licensed to practice law or medicine there
would be in effect a dual alliance imposed upon the licensed practitioner
it employed. Because a corporation can only act through its agents and
employees26 the practitioners it employed would owe a duty to the
corporation27 as well as to the patient or client.28 Such duties in many
instances would conflict. The benefits of a completely individual and
personal employment relationship29 and the danger of an impairment
of professional ethics by a management group3" are the two considera-
tions which justify the rule and have made the courts unwilling to
accept the analysis of the trade licenses cases and to segregate the
business functions of the corporate entity from the professional func-
tions of its licensed employees.
Having herein made a resume of the reasoning from which the
rule that corporations are incapable of practicing professions evolved,
a consideration of the holding in American Medical Association v.
United States leaves us with the following question: By what manner
of reasoning can it be said that a person or persons who combine to
stop a corporation from doing that which under the law it has no right
to do, are guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined by the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act?
FREDliCK H. FOwLE.
25 People v. Pacific Health Corp., Supra; People by Kerner v. United Medical
Service, Supra; Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, Supra.
26 New York & N. H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (1865).
27 Restatement of Agency (1938) Section 13.
28 Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence (1931) Section 96.
29 Stern v. Flyn, 154 Misc. 609; 278 N.Y.S. 598 (1935).
30 People v. Pacific Health Corp., Supra. -
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